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The New Partnership for African Development (Nepad): A False 
Start or a True Start for Shaping Africa’s Decolonised Future?* 
 
Mammo Muchie** 
 
 
NEPAD: False Start or a True Start? 
 
If you can look into the seeds of time, 
And say which grain will grow and which will not, 
Speak then to me, who neither beg nor fear 
Your favours nor your hate 
Shakespeare, Macbeth, 1.358-61 
 
History serves as a great reference for constructing futures. It provides the starting 
point- both the initial and boundary conditions-for making new moves and opening 
the future to human possibilities and the projection of positive goals. History is also 
a storehouse of the African data. It provides a mirror to look at Africa's past, 
present and future. Africa can only ignore to reflect its future in the mirror of its 
history at its own peril. Forty years has gone by, since an externally imposed 
development model, based on grants, loans, scanty foreign investment and unequal 
trade involving extraction of African mineral rights for foreign exchange to buy 
foreign manufactures replaced the direct colonial system. There is now a 
recognition that far from this externally-orientated development model denting 
growing poverty and inequality, it has produced debt (including debt servicing) in 
Africa, that has become both the highest in the world, and, more importantly, has 
foreclosed Africa's right to independent development. 
 
How can Africa earn its right to develop and structurally transform? What future; 
what destiny for Africa: a free future or an externally manipulated future? That is 
the 'to be or not to be question- the so-called 'Hamletian dilemma'- that fiercely 
confronts as a challenge to anyone that cares about Africa. When one looks at 
Africa through the mirror of its history, one finds it is not Africa that has failed, but 
the external development model and the way it has been imposed on African 
politics, economics, society, governance and culture by others. It is their project of 
                                                          
* Special lecture at One day Workshop on the African Liberation Day, organised by African 
Students Association in Denmark (ASAD), 8th June 2002. 
** Mammo Muchie is Associate Professor at Research Center on Development and International 
Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark. 
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development, their specific remedies and strategies that have been unjust. Should 
Africa rectify or justify the unjust system and its ideas that have failed her or not? 
Given the current convergence or confluence of information technology and 
financial services that have together formed speculative or casino capital on a 
global scale, it is important to ask can Africa ever make it to the promise land by 
playing dice in the casino world economy? 
 
The False Polarization will hurt Africa's future 
Our African leaders and even the G8 are now saying development aid has not 
worked.  That is true- aid, loans have not worked. The alternative panacea is said to 
be- not aid but trade, not loans but investment. The assumption is trade and 
investment will succeed where grants and loans have failed. 
 
From aid has not worked in Africa (an empirical fact), there has been an 
impermissible logical deduction that aid will not work in Africa. An even stronger 
claim is that trade and investment will work better in Africa. This has been the US's 
African Growth and Opportunity Act's message and now NEPAD's driving 
reductive and linear logic. 
 
Beyond Africa's shores the debate on whether there is life to aid or not is taking 
dramatic dimensions. The US Treasury Secretary Paul O' Neil joined a tour with 
Bono-a rock star from Ireland on a fact-finding mission to Africa. O' Neil says to 
Bono: prove that aid has worked. Thus the odd duo trekked across Africa to find 
cases of success.  
 
Needless to say, one does not need to make trips to know that there are and will be 
cases of "success", as there are many cases that can be found that have failed and 
were unsustainable. Need the duo trip (no pun intended) to demonstrate aid's 
relevance at all? As a piece of drama, yes, their trip made people watch with 
amusement. But as a serious act of finding what works in the fight against poverty 
and inequality- the action is suspect. The fact that there are some successful 
development projects and some failed ones cannot, should not and does not prove 
whether aid is successful or not. The issue of aid in relation to development is more 
than finding such fragments. It is different and lies beyond such fragmentary 
evidence. The issue is whether a vision and strategy for development is lost for the 
paltry money that the aid industry has been doling out to Africa. 
 
For aid to work, it must satisfy the following conditions: 
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1) That it is disbursed in a way that builds , promotes and assists social 
justice in Africa 
2) That it complements and not contradicts a clear, comprehensive African 
national development conceptual framework 
3) That it is untied to conditions that expel social policy like land reform, 
that  undermine social justice and  an African national policy framework  
4) That it is given on the basis of solidarity and not expectation of direct 
benefit to the donors. 
 
If these conditions are met, aid, loan, trade and investment will work. The more 
will be the merrier. 
 
Thus it is not aid, trade, investment or loans that are problems per se. It is the 
particular social relation that they express and reflect that has been the problem. In 
Africa donor aid failed because it was given to prop up allies, neutralize opponents, 
to pay for military bases and support counter- insurgency movements. Self-reliant 
and nationalist governments such as those of Nkrumah and Lumumba were 
undermined. The Western bureaucracies for aid management took a considerable 
amount of the aid budget. It is the political economy of post-war aid that was 
negative, not aid in itself. There were cases where two development workers earned 
50 % higher than the project budget of the aid program even from Scandinavia- 
countries known for dealing with aid in more transparent fashion than others. 
 
The Marshall Aid in Europe worked; US spent two per cent of its GNP to do it. It 
neither challenged the national policies and the independence of the Germans, the 
French and the British nor did it demand that their respective social-democratic 
consensus on which their post-war reconstruction depended be dismantled. There 
was no call for linking aid with deregulation of capital markets and the 
privatization of everything, the enclosure of all the commons and the conversion of 
public goods into private property. Here is, perhaps, a case, where the political 
economy of aid was not negative.  
 
Africa's future lies in making self-reliance and independence the cornerstone of 
social transformation and the protection of the social, economic and human rights 
of all Africans. NEPAD is strong on the rhetoric of self-reliance, while in reality 
inviting dependence under the guise of establishing partnership with donors and 
corporations. 
 
In Durban, Thabo Mbekei said:" It is clear that we are attempting something that is 
very big, necessarily difficult, but exceedingly necessary. What is critically 
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important for us as Africans is that we actually will move and we hope that you 
(international business leaders) will be our partner. We have to change." 
 
President Obasanjo of Nigeria said: "We cannot let it fail." Haiko Alfeld, the 
Director of the African Economic Forum repeated: "There has never been a better 
time for Africa to state its case, louder than ever, that it is ready for change and 
open for business. The opportunity presented by NEPAD is matched by an 
unprecedented global commitment to fight poverty and inequality." 
 
NEPAD tries to straddle two paradigms between African self-reliance and potential 
dependence on the western corporate world. Will Western business invest to 
provide health and education to every family in Africa or will it look after itself to 
make money in Africa? What is the term of the partnership that is sought? What is 
lost in making foreign direct investment or foreign corporations at the driving seat 
for African development? 
 
There is nothing wrong in the ambition or fantasy of NEPAD to bring about self-
reliant African-wide development. The issue is how, with what agency and for 
whom? Who loses or who gains is a relevant point to ask before NEPAD is fully 
confirmed as the economic program of the continent. 
 
NEPAD aspires to provide an African national economic program where 64 billion 
dollars is expected to come from outside in the form of investment. It also wants 
Africans to be "architects of their own sustained upliftment." But it sees this 
aspiration to be self-reliant with freedom from the "wards of benevolent guardians." 
It wants instead free trade and foreign direct investment and invites the donors to 
become "partners." The British Prime Minister has floated 10 billion dollars that he 
wished to get pledged at the meeting of the G8 in Alberta Canada provided the 
various regimes in Africa passed a peer review audit on good governance. The kind 
of good governance that is expected is not related to the explicit accomplishment of 
social rights. It is related to making the state coy from intervention in economic and 
social policy so that foreign capital is free, WTO trade rules are unimpeded and the 
market is given prominence in the economic life of society. 
 
Schizophrenia, Illusion and Dichotomies 
Combining the rhetoric of self-reliance with a plea for dependence on international 
business to pour foreign direct investment in Africa is schizophrenic. 
 
There are also two assumptions that NEPAD is premised upon. The first is not 
simply an assumption but a grand illusion which sees the West as ready to develop 
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Africa through foreign investment. That assumes a sea change in the way the West 
looks at Africa. The second grand illusion is that corporate power will invest to 
eradicate poverty and inequality in Africa. Corporations, as all private profit 
seeking organizations, will try to make profit. They need conditions that will make 
it difficult for the African State to pursue public policy in favour of social services, 
basic goods, the human and social rights of the majority- the ordinary people.1 
 
Moreover NEPAD is built on two dichotomies: that trade and investment are to be 
favored over loans and grants; and it is prepared to attract investment and trade 
based on the deregulation of the capital and current account and removal of any 
national control over trade. Moreover, African countries are expected to undergo a 
peer - review to qualify for investment and preferential trade. 
 
In other words, like the grants and loans before them, trade and investment too will 
be tied with conditions that potentially can exacerbate divisions amongst African 
states. The conditions that African governments are expected to meet are related to 
making their economies more open than they are at present. Africans are expected 
to buy the global discourse that de-regulating trade and current and capital accounts 
will reduce poverty and inequality. However, creating a deregulated economic 
environment in Africa with fast movements of capital will exacerbate inequalities 
and the burden on the poor. Social justice, investment in education, health and 
basic needs require not vastly deregulated trade and capital markets, but action that 
can steer trade and investment to benefit people across society. 
 
The issue that NEPAD has run away from is the political economy of Africa's 
development. That has been a problem in the early 1960s and it is still a problem 
now: a major blight blocking the bright light from shining over Africa's future. Our 
leaders have thus skirted away the main issue by hiding behind the mechanical 
distinction of trade not aid, and/or investment not loans. All of these- grants, loans, 
trade and investment- are potentially useful and can assist Africa's transformation. 
The trick lies in the context of their introduction: how they flow in, who manages 
them, where they go; the volume and rate of flow, the degree of their absorption, 
and what social relations they sustain, who benefits and who loses and so on. In the 
end what matters is accounting the political economy of aid, loans, trade and 
investment and their impact on the livelihood of ordinary people (i.e.whether they 
impart dependence on or self-reliance from the donors). 
 
If grants, trade, investment and loans are received by making Africa lose its right to 
develop its education, health and basic needs, then none of these measures are 
useful no matter how much they flow into Africa. Development that subtracts the 
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human rights of Africans as it fills the pockets of others is in the end a no going 
area. There is a need to develop new conceptual alternatives to African 
development qualitatively different to the pattern of mal-development that has 
prevailed in Africa to this day. Unfortunately NEPAD forgets Africa's own 
wisdom: 
 
"The hand that receives is always under the one that gives" 
 
It is this African saying or proverb that should provide the logic for creating a new 
framework of interaction between Africa and the rest of the world. Aid, loans, trade 
and investment can all help, but they can also hurt. In this context, the Pan-African 
revival is not merely an option. It is a necessary alternative to get out of the trap of 
dependence and attain Africa's self-reliance and an independent voice in the world.  
 
Why Pan-Africanism? The reason is that unity on any other basis will not bring to 
birth an emancipated or free Africa.  Is there any other social institution that can 
serve as the organizing principle to bring the fullness or richness of Africa's unity 
in freedom? I can enumerate a number: the family, the clan, the tribe, the 
community, the church, the trade union, social movements, political parties, the 
nationality, the ethnic group, the existing artificial states or the current neo-liberal 
inspired creations such as the growing and conflicting or competing number of 
NGOs, civil society, the private sector (businesses), new regions and so on. While 
these institutions and identities are important and may be necessary, none of them 
can become the institutional instrument for bringing about a broader conception of 
Africa's role and place in the wider and larger scheme of things. The reason is 
simple: They are too dispersed, discrete and have difficulties in transforming their 
specific interests into a general interest.  Each of these social units or arrangements 
leave the door open for divisions and for others who do not mean well to Africa to 
get in and sow discord and distrust. We must wake up to the fact that Africa's long 
history from ancient Egypt to the present day provides a clarion call and a 
compelling case for its unity. What is absent is not the rhetoric for this need of 
Africa's unity. There is an inflation of rhetoric inversely proportional to the 
deflation in action. All the governments of the OAU have signed to some notion of 
Pan-African ideal. But nearly two-thirds of them have not paid their dues. They 
thus pay lip service to the organization. Most have now ratified the AU. But 
judging by the way they treated the OAU, the future of the AU is uncertain. AU 
may be, as one analyst quipped- OAU without the "O."  
 
What is disturbing is that there is massive hypocrisy played by the leaders: talking 
Pan-African and acting anti-Pan-African and, at the same time, excluding those 
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with committed interest to realize the political and economic unification of the 
continent. There is a great need for a moral and intellectual resolution and clarity to 
construct free Africa. Africa as a civic nation based on the emancipated citizen 
must be forged. Free Africa needs a new kind of being- a citizen of the African 
world with a globalized African soul free from petty allegiances and labels, 
possessing a revitalized sense of a civic-African self and personality as a premier 
identity. 
 
Unfortunately the authors of NEPAD, as indeed, all our current leaders continue to 
play footsie with the only direction that will bring pride, strength and freedom to 
Africa- the Pan-African ideal and vision. They take action without a vision. And 
action taken without a vision often times leads to a nightmare. Time and time again 
they have acted to deepen Africa's nightmares. They repeat what Frantz Fanon with 
such incredible foresight predicted some forty years ago in his classic book: "The 
Wretched of the Earth." Let me paraphrase what he says on the pitfalls of a false 
national consciousness: The African elite discovers its historic mission to be that of 
only becoming an intermediary to the Western interests. And it makes its sole 
business to fulfill this mission without fail. It is comfortable with being a business 
agent of Western interests. And it plays this part without any complexes with full of 
ceremony and pomp, red carpet and 21-gun salute. But this lucrative connection of 
the African fragmented elite with the West comes at a price: growing pauperization 
of the African population. Some 350 million people live on a 65 cents a day income 
today! It plays its cheap-Jack function with a meanness of outlook towards social 
justice for the many in Africa. The elite lacks an independent vision, its own 
ambition and its own imagination different from that of the elite of the West. If the 
Western elite wishes to break up the Congo, the elite joins its different fractions. It 
thus loses virility and capacity to make history and shape events. It becomes an 
agent in the victimization of Africa by failing to acquire national agency to fulfill a 
historic mission. It acquires an agency for effectuating Africa's great betrayal. 
Fanon then says, lamentably absent are the dynamic, pioneering spirit, the acumen 
of the inventor and the discoverer of new worlds, which are found in the social 
groups from within the West. In Africa, the elite wallows in the marsh and spirit of 
indulgence. Unfortunately it learns the indulgence and decadence of the West not 
its spirit of innovation and inventiveness. In its very beginnings the African elite 
abandons national liberation for the opulence and hedonism of life from the West. 
Fanon ends his remarkable insight with an extraordinarily time tested remark: 
 
"We need not think it is jumping ahead; it is in fact beginning at the end. It is 
already senile before it has come to know the petulance, the fearlessness, or the 
will to succeed of youth." 
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Two recent examples, one from Uganda and the other from Malawi- illustrate the 
continuation of the 'comprador' mentality diagnosed by Fanon a long time ago. 
 
The Uganda case involved a scandal related to stopping money to treat HIV/AIDS. 
The minister of health wanted more funds to treat HIV/AIDS, and the minister of 
finance refused to accept funds from outside because of the impact such funds 
might have in overvaluing the Uganda shilling. And the minister was afraid of the 
IMF condition/edict to keep inflation low even at the expense of the health and 
education of the people would be violated. Paul O' Neil was asked about this when 
he was in Uganda and the story got out to all of us because he challenged the IMF's 
cruel priority of economics over the lives of Africans. Proof that our elites have lost 
their intellect, their soul as they have alienated themselves in life style from the 
very people they have sprung from. This is an example, amongst many, why the 
African elite suffers from the vice Fanon diagnosed with such precision.  
 
The Malawi case is related to the current hunger in the region.  IMF is implicated in 
advising the Malawi Government to sell last year’s maize harvest of that country 
ostensibly because Malawi does not have appropriate storage facilities. The money 
from the sale of the country's maize was used to pay off some of the IMF loans 
with interest. At the moment, Malawi has no money and no maize and the country 
has degraded from poverty into hunger and misery. IMF, of course, could have 
advised Malawi to build storage facilities and store maize for lean and drought 
times, but that was not what interested the IMF's neo-liberal bankers. They insisted 
on the payback of their loans and the reduction of Malawi's indebtedness even at 
the risk of people potentially exposed to the wasting state of famine. 
 
While IMF has to pursue its interests, the African official elite sings to the IMF 
music at the risk of spreading disease and hunger to its own people. So one can see 
why we cannot rely on Africa's official elite to deliver free Africa. While I am for 
engaging constructively with it, I am also mindful that citizens of Africa have to 
learn to take action. Africans from the Cape to Cairo and from inside and outside 
Africa have to select the seed and grain that will grow from that, that will not. We 
should say Africa: you deserve no more wrong turns. No more talking self-reliance 
and walking dependence! Africa has been wronged for thousands of years. Its hour 
of freedom must come. And its own children need to be sharp, discerning and 
emerge as a community of knowledge and resistance against injustice. They must 
learn to subvert that which makes them look elsewhere when they should look 
inside Africa and tap resources by preventing the massive embezzlement and 
robbery that is going on in broad day light. NEPAD must learn to stop Africa's 
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resources from flowing out and not seek to invite international corporations to milk 
further Africa's resources. 
 
The broad history of Africans in relation to the outside world has been similar 
despite the various differences that exist internally. There are no permanent 
differences that cannot be overcome with a Pan-African vision. The current 
challenges Africans face worldwide are also similar. Africa's history and traditions 
and the common external and internal challenges the continent faces are useful 
resources to build a shared purpose and action to spark Africa's possible burst into a 
great historical future. Let it not be said that the best lack of all convictions when 
the fools express their foolish subservience to western interests with passionate 
intensity. Let us subvert in all of us the intimate enemy within the self, and learn to 
de-toxify our colonial personality to make all fully fit to become Africans with 
civic sense, civic expression and civic engagement. It is on the basis of an African 
citizenship, African civic identity and a positive goal and purpose shared as 
Africans that further trust, social networking and responsible engagement with 
public life will be achieved by Africa's free and equal citizens. 
 
A shared perspective that builds on Africa's history and common contemporary 
challenges can be built with the ideas and practice of Pan-Africanism. One can thus 
see why there is a great need for building Pan-Africanism, to re-imagine Africa 
within the archaeology of liberation and not continue with the realities and 
narratives of Africa's unending oppression. There is a need to build what I shall call 
'new Pan-Africanism' as a concept, knowledge, and strategy for imagining, 
envisioning and building a new African world. Pan-African ideas, visions and 
worldviews guide, enable and make African states free and capable of creating a 
new, self-reliant and non-dependent partnerships with the rest of the world. 
Bringing Pan-Africanism back in at present is thus not to de-link but to re-link 
Africa with the world on a basis of a new concept of international relations. The 
Pan-African revival expresses the yearning to get a re-definition of the unjust 
linkages between Africa and the rest of the world. We must continue the battle of 
ideas to make NEPAD realize that no self-reliance is as effective as self-reliance 
coming from the foundational architecture of a united and free Africa. Let the 
Africa the others like to see- a jungle, a place for exotic animals, backward people 
run by despotic rulers, ethnic conflicts, hunger, and exporter of street sweepers, 
porters and maids to the West-end. Let us bring out the Africa that is seldom talked 
about. Africa is the home of the first humans, the mother of all cultures, the home 
of the first religion, the origin of the first language, the home of such great centers 
of learning such as Timbuktu, the source of home-grown democratic institutions. It 
is a great continent with distinct civilizations looking into the seeds of time and 
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expecting this and coming generations to transform Africa into a civic and 
egalitarian nation in the 21st century. 
 
Fanon said that every generation has to discover its mission and must either fulfil it 
or betray it. The project of making the African civic nation built on social justice is 
the historic mission of the day. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Cuba has followed a social policy free from conditions for providing freedom to capital flows. 
This has enabled Cuba to fulfill fully the social rights of the people. It has now an education and 
health system considered on the same standard as the developed world. The Cuban leader 
protested fiercely against US- Government accusations against the Cuban social system: Cuba's 
achievement in health and education:"is not tyranny as Mr. W. (George Bush). - calls it. It is 
justice and real equality among human beings." President Fidel Castro added: "Today, not a 
single cent has landed in the pockets of Castro and his followers… None of them can be included 
in the long list of neo- liberal friends of Mr. W. in Latin America who are Olympic champions of 
embezzlement and robbery." (Speech on June 1, 2002, Havana, Cuba). This characterization by 
the Cuban leader applies even more to the compradorism prevalent in Africa. NEPAD risks 
falling in the trap by unthinkingly copying 'free market romanticism,' and making free trade, 
freedom for capital as conditions for  "good governance," rather than the achievement of social 
rights, i.e, freedom from misery and ill-being. Good governance comes with the education and 
health of a people not against sacrificing them in the hope of getting corporate power to develop 
one’s country-as preached by contemporary neo- liberalism. 
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